Globalization Reconsidered: Shifting Power in a Multipolar Economy

International Academy
3 hours ago
15 min read

Author: Layla Omar — Affiliation: Independent Researcher

Abstract

For more than three decades, globalization was commonly described as a process of deepening economic integration led mainly by advanced Western economies. Trade liberalization, global value chains, and cross-border investment created a world in which production and finance were organized on a truly global scale. In the 2020s, this narrative is being challenged. Geopolitical tensions, trade wars, industrial policy, and regional security concerns have brought new forms of “geoeconomic fragmentation,” while emerging powers in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America expand their economic and diplomatic influence. Recent reports from international organizations highlight a world of modest but persistent growth, rising trade restrictions, and a shift from a largely US-centric order toward a more multipolar balance of power.

This article asks how globalization should be understood in this emerging multipolar economy. It argues that globalization is not simply ending or reversing; rather, it is being reorganized. Trade and investment are increasingly shaped by geopolitical blocs, “friendshoring,” regional agreements, and digital platforms. At the same time, the Global South – sometimes described as the “Global Majority” – is gaining weight in global output, trade, and diplomacy, even while many developing countries face slow growth and vulnerability to shocks.

The article is conceptual and structured like a Scopus-style journal paper. It combines recent empirical trends with three theoretical lenses: Bourdieu’s theory of capital, world-systems theory, and institutional isomorphism. Bourdieu helps explain how economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital shape which firms and countries benefit from or are marginalized by globalization. World-systems theory highlights the persistence and reconfiguration of core–semi-periphery–periphery hierarchies in a multipolar context. Institutional isomorphism explains why, even as geopolitical fragmentation increases, corporate practices in areas like sustainability, governance, and digital compliance converge across regions.

The analysis suggests that international business now operates in a world of simultaneous integration and fragmentation: cross-border flows remain high, particularly in digital trade, yet the rules of the game are more contested. The findings point toward a future in which power is more diffuse, regional clusters more important, and legitimacy – not only efficiency – central to global strategy. The article concludes with implications for policy, management, and future research on globalization in a multipolar economy.

1. Introduction

Globalization was once described as a powerful, almost unstoppable, force integrating markets, production, and finance. Many observers in the 1990s and 2000s saw a clear direction of travel: more trade, more investment, more global value chains, and more influence for global institutions.

In the last decade, however, this optimism has been replaced by a more cautious and sometimes anxious debate. Several shocks and trends have changed the tone:

The global financial crisis and its long aftermath;
Growing inequality and political backlash against free trade in some advanced economies;
The COVID-19 pandemic and the exposure of fragile supply chains;
Intensifying strategic rivalry between major powers, especially the United States and China;
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and related energy and security shocks;
The rise of industrial policy, technology controls, and new trade restrictions;
Growing emphasis on climate policy, digital governance, and national security.

International institutions now speak of “geoeconomic fragmentation,” warning that competing blocs and escalating trade restrictions could reduce long-term global output and slow convergence between rich and poor countries.

At the same time, new centers of economic and political gravity are clearly visible. Emerging and developing economies, especially in Asia and parts of the Middle East and Africa, account for a rising share of global GDP, trade, and foreign exchange reserves. Expanded groupings such as BRICS+ and new regional initiatives show the ambition of the Global South to shape rules rather than simply follow them.

This evolving landscape has prompted the idea of a multipolar economy: a world where economic and political power are more widely distributed across several major poles, rather than dominated by a single superpower or a small group of advanced economies. But what does this mean for globalization itself? Has globalization ended, or is it being redefined?

This article argues that globalization is best understood today as globalization under tension – still present, still powerful, but more contested and uneven. Rather than a linear movement toward a fully integrated world market, we now see a patchwork of overlapping trade blocs, digital spheres, and regional alliances.

To make sense of this, the article uses three complementary theories:

Bourdieu’s theory of capital emphasizes how different forms of capital – economic, cultural, social, symbolic – structure opportunities and outcomes in global markets.
World-systems theory provides a macro-structural view of core, semi-periphery, and periphery, and how power shifts reshuffle these relations.
Institutional isomorphism helps explain why, even in a fragmented system, corporate and institutional practices converge through regulation, imitation, and professional norms.

The goal is to provide a clear, human-readable but rigorous framework for understanding globalization in a multipolar economy, suitable for students, researchers, and practitioners interested in management, international business, and global policy.

2. Background and Theoretical Framework

2.1 From Hyper-Globalization to a Multipolar, Fragmented Order

Empirical evidence shows that global integration has slowed but not collapsed. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook projects global growth of around 3.2% in 2024 and 2025, with trade volumes recovering after pandemic-era disruptions but facing persistent headwinds from trade tensions and weak investment.

World Bank Global Economic Prospects reports describe “substantial headwinds” from increased trade tensions, elevated uncertainty, and subdued foreign direct investment, particularly into emerging and developing economies.

The World Trade Organization’s monitoring shows a steady accumulation of trade-restricting measures: as of late 2024, import restrictions in force affected nearly 12% of world imports, up from about 10% a year earlier, with little rollback of existing barriers.

Alongside this, long-term shifts in economic weight are clear. Emerging economies, including the enlarged BRICS group and other large developing countries, account for a growing share of global output and reserves. Some estimates suggest that BRICS countries and new candidates together could represent more than one-third of global GDP and nearly half of world reserves by the mid-2020s.

At the same time, international reports on trade fragmentation warn that the proliferation of selective trade deals and the weakening of multilateral principles like “most-favored nation” can especially harm developing economies, which depend on predictable, non-discriminatory access to markets.

In short, globalization continues but under altered conditions:

Power is more distributed, with rising roles for emerging economies;
Rules are more contested, with more trade, investment, and technology restrictions;
Digital networks and data flows are increasingly important, but also regulated and politicized.

2.2 Bourdieu’s Capital in a Global Context

Pierre Bourdieu distinguishes between several forms of capital that shape people’s and organizations’ positions in social space:

Economic capital: financial resources, physical assets, productive capacity;
Cultural capital: education, skills, language, and familiarity with dominant norms;
Social capital: networks, alliances, and trust-based relationships;
Symbolic capital: prestige, reputation, and recognized legitimacy.

In a globalized economy, these forms of capital operate at multiple levels:

For countries, economic capital includes infrastructure and industrial base; cultural capital includes expertise, research capacity, and global-language education; social capital involves diplomatic ties, regional alliances, and trade agreements; symbolic capital refers to international reputation, credit ratings, and perceived reliability.
For firms, economic capital covers balance sheets and technology; cultural capital reflects managerial and technical skills; social capital consists of supply-chain relationships and cross-border networks; symbolic capital includes brand strength and ESG credibility.

Recent work on “cosmopolitan” or “digital” capital extends Bourdieu’s ideas to global elites and digital platforms, showing how global exposure, multilingual education, and digital capabilities become key assets in a multipolar world.

Applying Bourdieu to globalization highlights that shifting power is not only about GDP shares. It is also about who controls knowledge, standards, narratives, and networks – and who is perceived as legitimate in setting global rules.

2.3 World-Systems Theory and Shifting Core–Periphery Dynamics

World-systems theory views the world economy as a single system structured into core, semi-periphery, and periphery:

The core hosts high-skill, capital-intensive production and major financial centers;
The semi-periphery combines features of both, hosting manufacturing and increasingly some high-value services;
The periphery supplies raw materials, low-wage labor, and is often more dependent on external capital.

This framework helps explain long-term patterns of inequality and dependency. It also provides language to describe current shifts:

Some large emerging economies are moving from semi-periphery toward more core-like roles, especially in manufacturing, technology, and finance.
New development corridors – such as infrastructure and energy partnerships linking Asia, Africa, and the Middle East – express efforts to reshape global linkages and reduce reliance on traditional core economies.
Yet many low-income countries risk falling further behind, with World Bank reports warning of the slowest non-recession global growth in decades and persistent obstacles to convergence.

World-systems theory thus suggests that multipolarity does not automatically mean equality. Instead, it may create new patterns of hierarchy, including new regional cores and connector countries that link different blocs.

2.4 Institutional Isomorphism and Global Convergence

Institutional isomorphism explains why organizations in similar fields become more alike, even across countries. DiMaggio and Powell identify three mechanisms:

Coercive isomorphism: pressure from laws, regulations, and powerful actors;
Mimetic isomorphism: imitation under uncertainty, copying perceived leaders;
Normative isomorphism: professional standards, education, and shared norms.

In the global economy, these mechanisms shape corporate governance, accounting standards, sustainability reporting, and risk management. Even as trade rules fragment, firms often face converging expectations in areas such as:

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure;
Anti-money-laundering and sanctions compliance;
Data protection and cybersecurity;
Corporate social responsibility and human rights due diligence.

This means that globalization of norms and practices can continue even when geopolitical competition intensifies. For multinational enterprises, legitimacy increasingly depends on meeting these evolving global standards, regardless of which bloc or region they operate in.

3. Methodology

This article uses a conceptual and integrative methodology. It does not present original empirical data but synthesizes findings from contemporary research, policy reports, and theoretical work to build an analytical narrative about globalization in a multipolar economy.

3.1 Sources

The analysis draws on three main types of sources:

Recent international economic reports (2019–2025) from organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and UNCTAD, which provide up-to-date data on growth, trade, investment, and fragmentation.
Academic and analytical articles on multipolarity, geoeconomic fragmentation, and international business strategy in the 2020s.
Classic theoretical texts on capital, world-systems, and institutional isomorphism, used to frame the meaning of shifting power and convergence.

3.2 Analytical Approach

The analysis proceeds in three steps:

Mapping: summarizing key empirical trends in trade, growth, and policy that characterize today’s global economy.
Theoretical interpretation: applying Bourdieu, world-systems theory, and institutional isomorphism to interpret these trends as expressions of shifting power and institutional change.
Synthesis: drawing out implications for how globalization should be conceptualized and for how firms and policymakers might navigate a multipolar environment.

The article seeks theoretical generalization rather than statistical generalization, offering concepts and relationships that future empirical research can test and refine.

4. Analysis

4.1 Power Diffusion and the Idea of a Multipolar Economy

Recent analyses describe an economic order in which the relative weight of the advanced industrial economies declines while emerging economies collectively gain influence. Discussions of the “Global South” or “Global Majority” highlight both demographic and economic shifts:

Emerging economies account for most of global population and an increasing share of global growth and investment;
Expanded groupings like BRICS+ and new regional coalitions seek greater voice in global institutions and rule-setting;
Sovereign wealth funds and reserve holdings in emerging markets give them growing influence in global finance.

At the same time, advanced economies still host many of the world’s largest corporations, research institutions, and high-value tech clusters. The US dollar remains the dominant reserve currency, although long-term trends show a gradual decline in its share of global reserves and interest in greater currency diversification.

In Bourdieu’s terms, this is a story of redistribution of capital:

Some emerging economies accumulate economic capital (GDP, reserves, infrastructure), cultural capital (skilled labor, R&D capacity), and social capital (regional alliances), translating into symbolic capital as increasingly recognized powers.
Traditional core economies still hold large stocks of all four types of capital but face challenges from domestic inequality, political polarization, and strategic over-stretch.

The result is not a simple replacement of one hegemon by another, but a more diffuse configuration of power with several major poles – North America, Europe, China, other Asian powers, and coalitions of Global South states – interacting in sometimes cooperative, sometimes competitive ways.

4.2 Geoeconomic Fragmentation, Trade Blocs, and Value Chains

International organizations warn that rising trade restrictions, technology controls, and targeted sanctions could have long-term costs. IMF and World Bank studies estimate that severe trade and technology fragmentation could reduce global output by several percentage points, with larger proportional losses for developing economies.

The pattern emerging is not total decoupling but selective fragmentation and regionalization:

Countries pursue friendshoring and nearshoring, building supply chains within trusted networks and nearby regions;
Sensitive sectors such as semiconductors, critical minerals, green technologies, and digital infrastructure become objects of industrial policy and security screening;
Multinational enterprises adjust with multi-regional strategies, maintaining global reach but with more duplicated capacity and differentiated product lines.

World-systems theory suggests that this fragmentation may consolidate new regional cores (for example, in East and South Asia or parts of the Middle East) while exposing some periphery countries to greater marginalization if they are left outside key blocs or corridors. Connector countries – those with ties to multiple poles – may gain strategic importance as hubs for trade, finance, or diplomacy.

For firms, this environment means balancing cost efficiency against resilience and political risk. Strategies often combine:

Diversified sourcing and manufacturing footprints;
Investment in regional logistics and local partnerships;
Attention to sanctions, export controls, and local content rules;
Scenario planning for different degrees of bloc formation and policy shocks.

4.3 Financial System and Currency Multipolarity

The international monetary and financial system has long been anchored by the US dollar. While the dollar remains dominant, several reports and analytical pieces point to gradual diversification:

The dollar’s share of global reserves has slowly declined since the late 1990s;
Bilateral currency arrangements and local-currency trade settlements have expanded among emerging economies;
Regional financial arrangements and development banks have grown in size and number.

At the same time, geopolitical tensions raise the risk of financial fragmentation, with sanctions and de-risking of cross-border banking impacting flows. Analysts warn that such fragmentation could undermine the efficiency of global capital markets and the provision of global public goods, including crisis finance.

Again, this points to a more multipolar but potentially unstable system: more actors with influence, but also more scope for misalignment and policy conflict.

4.4 Digital Globalization and AI as a New Arena of Power

Digitalization is arguably the most dynamic dimension of globalization today. Cross-border data flows, digital services trade, and global platforms connect users and firms across countries in real time. The WTO’s recent reports highlight the potential of artificial intelligence to increase global trade by around one-third and global GDP by over 10% by 2040, if widely adopted.

At the same time, digital governance is deeply contested:

Competing models of data protection, platform regulation, and AI oversight are emerging across major jurisdictions;
Countries introduce data localization and cybersecurity laws with extraterritorial effects;
Digital infrastructure and standards – including 5G, cloud services, and payment systems – become strategic assets in geopolitical competition.

Here, Bourdieu’s concept of digital capital is helpful: those who control data, algorithms, and digital networks hold a powerful form of capital that can be converted into economic rents and symbolic influence. Advanced economies and large platform companies currently dominate many digital arenas, but emerging economies are increasingly active in developing their own digital ecosystems and regulatory frameworks.

Institutional isomorphism is visible in the spread of digital norms: international firms often adopt the strictest data protection and cybersecurity standards across their operations, both to simplify compliance and to signal trust to users and regulators. Professional communities of data protection officers, cybersecurity experts, and AI ethicists further diffuse shared practices, even when national regulations differ.

4.5 ESG, Legitimacy, and Converging Expectations

In the multipolar economy, legitimacy is increasingly important. Firms are judged not only on profit but also on their environmental impact, labor practices, and governance. Empirical studies of multinational enterprises in emerging markets show that ESG strategies are often adopted in response to institutional pressures from investors, regulators, and global supply-chain partners.

These pressures take the form of:

Coercive demands for sustainability reporting, due-diligence, and climate disclosure;
Mimetic adoption of ESG frameworks used by leading firms and index providers;
Normative expectations promoted by professional bodies, standard setters, and rating agencies.

From a Bourdieusian standpoint, good ESG performance and credible reporting create symbolic capital: they enhance firms’ reputation and open access to global capital markets or premium customer segments. For countries, strong environmental and governance credentials can improve their image as investment destinations and partners.

World-systems theory, however, urges caution: if ESG standards are designed without attention to capacity differences, they may function as new barriers for low-income producers or serve as tools for green protectionism. The challenge is to ensure that convergence in sustainability practices supports inclusive development rather than reinforcing existing hierarchies.

4.6 Who Gains and Who Risks Being Left Behind?

The combined use of Bourdieu, world-systems theory, and institutional isomorphism reveals a complex picture:

Emerging powers and regional hubs that accumulate multiple forms of capital – economic strength, skilled labor, dense networks, and strong symbolic narratives – are well placed to benefit from multipolarity.
Traditional core economies retain deep structural advantages but face internal political constraints and external competition.
Many low-income countries risk remaining on the margins, particularly if trade fragmentation erodes predictable market access and if they lack the resources to meet new digital and sustainability standards.

At the same time, new opportunities exist: connector states that cultivate diverse alliances, invest in digital capacity, and position themselves as neutral hubs can play important roles in finance, logistics, and diplomacy. Similarly, smaller firms that leverage digital platforms and niche skills can reach global customers even in a fragmented world, provided they can navigate regulatory complexity.

5. Findings

The conceptual analysis leads to several key findings about globalization in a multipolar economy:

Globalization is being reorganized, not reversed.Trade, investment, and digital flows remain large, but their geography and governance are changing. Regionalization, friendshoring, and selective fragmentation are reshaping global value chains, rather than eliminating them.
Power is more diffuse, but hierarchies persist.Economic and political influence is spreading beyond traditional core economies, with rising roles for emerging powers and coalitions in the Global South. However, world-systems structures of core, semi-periphery, and periphery remain visible, and many low-income countries risk further marginalization.
Different forms of capital shape winners and losers.Using Bourdieu’s framework, the ability of firms and countries to benefit from multipolar globalization depends not only on GDP, but also on cultural, social, and symbolic capital – skills, networks, and legitimacy. Growing importance of digital capital and cosmopolitan capital further differentiates actors.
Fragmentation and convergence coexist.Geoeconomic fragmentation increases policy divergence and bloc formation, yet institutional isomorphism pushes organizations toward similar standards in areas like ESG, governance, and digital compliance. Globalization of norms and practices can continue even when geopolitical cooperation declines.
Digital and green transitions are new arenas of competition and cooperation.AI, data governance, and climate policy will shape future trade and production patterns. They can either deepen divides or, if managed cooperatively, open new paths for sustainable development and shared growth.
Legitimacy and resilience become central strategic goals.In a multipolar and uncertain world, the ability to maintain domestic and international legitimacy, manage shocks, and adapt to new rules is as important as traditional cost competitiveness.
Policy choices will determine whether multipolarity is inclusive or conflictual.Well-designed multilateral and regional frameworks, along with careful domestic policy, can help transform multipolarity into an opportunity for a more balanced and sustainable globalization. Poorly designed policies, by contrast, risk producing mutually damaging fragmentation.

6. Conclusion

The phrase “globalization reconsidered” captures the main challenge of the 2020s. The simple story of a single, integrated global market driven by liberalization and technology no longer fits reality. Instead, the world economy is characterized by shifting power in a multipolar system, where emerging powers, regional coalitions, and digital platforms all play significant roles alongside traditional core economies.

This article has argued that we should understand this emerging order through three complementary lenses. Bourdieu’s theory of capital shows that economic power alone does not determine outcomes; cultural, social, symbolic, and digital capital matter deeply for who gains voice and influence. World-systems theory reminds us that core–periphery dynamics continue, even as new regional cores and connector states emerge. Institutional isomorphism explains why, despite geopolitical rivalry, firms and institutions often converge around similar standards and practices.

For policymakers, the analysis implies that strategies should focus on building broad forms of capital: investing in education and skills, strengthening regional and international networks, and cultivating reputations for reliability, innovation, and responsibility. For firms, it suggests that global strategy now requires a fine balance between diversification and focus, between compliance with varied regimes and internal coherence, and between financial performance and legitimacy.

For researchers and students, the multipolar economy offers a rich agenda. Future work can empirically test the patterns suggested here: how foreign direct investment shifts with fragmentation, how connector countries manage their roles, how digital and ESG standards diffuse across blocs, and how specific industries reorganize under multipolar pressures.

Globalization is not over; it is changing shape. Whether this new phase leads to more sustainable and inclusive outcomes, or to deeper fragmentation and inequality, will depend on the choices made by states, firms, and societies in the coming years.

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