Corporate Governance and Accountability in the Global South

Author: Habib Hassan

Affiliation: Independent Researcher

Abstract

Discussions about sustainable development, inequality, and economic stability in the Global South now focus on corporate governance and accountability. In the last ten years, the rise of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) agendas, as well as the rapid financialisation and digitalisation of the world, have put new demands on businesses in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. However, corporate governance in these areas is still heavily influenced by the historical effects of colonialism, state-led development, concentrated ownership, and weak formal institutions. This article analyses corporate governance and accountability in the Global South through three interrelated theoretical frameworks: Bourdieu’s theory of capital and field, world-systems theory, and institutional isomorphism.

The article examines the interplay between global corporate governance norms and local power structures, elite networks, and state-business relations, utilising a qualitative synthesis of recent scholarly research, policy documents, and illustrative country examples. The analysis emphasises four principal domains: ownership and control, regulatory frameworks, global standard-setting (encompassing ESG and sustainability reporting), and the influence of civil society and digital transparency.

The results indicate that although the formal adoption of "global best practices" has advanced, accountability frequently remains inconsistent, superficial, and incomplete. Corporate governance reforms often replicate established power hierarchies, even as they establish new avenues for minority shareholders, employees, and communities to assert their voices. The article asserts that authentic accountability in the Global South necessitates more than mere technical reform; it requires the redistribution of various forms of capital, the fortification of public institutions, and governance models attuned to context that acknowledge historical and structural inequalities.

1. Introduction

Corporate governance and accountability are no longer just legal issues that are talked about in boardrooms and corporate law journals. They are now at the centre of discussions about climate change, social justice, economic resilience, and sustainable development. High-profile corporate scandals, environmental disasters, and social conflicts over mining, energy, and infrastructure projects in the Global South have made people ask important questions: Who is in charge of big companies? Who do they have to answer to? And how can the power of businesses be used to help with bigger goals for development?

In many Global South countries, there are both listed companies and large family-owned conglomerates, state-owned businesses, and informal or semi-formal business groups. Reforms in corporate governance, such as rules for board independence, standards for disclosure, audit committees, targets for gender diversity, and ESG reporting, are becoming more popular as ways to get foreign investment and make companies work better (Ararat, 2021; McNally, 2023). At the same time, worldwide discussions about responsible business practices, human rights due diligence, and sustainability reporting are putting new demands on companies and regulators. Nonetheless, the worldwide dissemination of corporate governance standards transpires within an institutional framework. It interacts with the histories of colonial economies in the area, the ways that land and wealth are concentrated, authoritarian or mixed political systems, and the uneven integration into global markets. Researchers contend that emerging and developing economies demonstrate both a convergence towards global paradigms and a pronounced local path dependence in ownership frameworks and governance methodologies.

This article centres on "Corporate Governance and Accountability in the Global South" as a pertinent subject for academic inquiry and policy discourse. It wants to:

Give a theoretically sound summary of how corporate governance works in the Global South.

Demonstrate the analysis of power and inequality through Bourdieu’s notions of capital and field, world-systems theory, and institutional isomorphism.

Talk about recent changes in governance reforms and accountability related to ESG.

Find the most important results and what they mean for investors, policymakers, regulators, and civil society.

The article is written in simple, easy-to-understand language and has a structure that is similar to that of a high-quality academic journal article. This makes it good for a wide range of readers who are interested in management, law, development, and political economy.

2. Background and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Corporate governance in the Global South

Corporate governance is often defined as the system by which companies are directed and controlled, including relationships among shareholders, boards, managers, creditors, employees and other stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In the Global South, these relationships are embedded in contexts where:

• Ownership is highly concentrated in families, business groups or the state.

• Legal systems may be under-resourced, slow, or unevenly enforced.

• Capital markets are relatively shallow, with bank or state financing playing a large role.

• Informal networks and patronage relationships remain influential.

Research on emerging markets shows that corporate governance is an important determinant of firm performance, access to capital, and investor protection, but that governance mechanisms often work differently from those in widely dispersed ownership systems found in some high-income economies (Ararat, 2021; Joyce, 2024). Weak minority shareholder protections, related-party transactions, and political connections are common concerns.

At the same time, Global South countries have been active laboratories of governance experimentation. Codes of corporate governance, listing rules, stewardship codes, and ESG disclosure requirements have been introduced in many jurisdictions during the past two decades (World Bank, 2014; McNally, 2023). These reforms reflect both local dynamics and global pressures from investors, development agencies and transnational standard-setting bodies.

To make sense of these complex processes, this article uses three theoretical perspectives: Bourdieu’s theory of capital and fields, world-systems theory, and institutional isomorphism.

2.2 Bourdieu: capital, field, and corporate elites

Pierre Bourdieu conceptualises society as composed of multiple “fields”—structured spaces of positions and power—within which actors struggle for different forms of capital: economic, social, cultural and symbolic (Bourdieu, 1986; Harvey, 2008).

Applied to corporate governance, this perspective suggests that:

• Economic capital includes ownership stakes, control over financial resources, and access to credit.

• Social capital refers to networks of relationships among business families, politicians, regulators, and professionals (Bourdieu, 1986).

• Cultural capital includes education, professional credentials, and expertise, such as law and finance.

• Symbolic capital is the recognised legitimacy associated with being seen as a “good” or “modern” corporation—often achieved through governance codes, ESG ratings, or prestigious board appointments.

Corporate elites in the Global South often accumulate and convert these forms of capital, for instance by transforming political connections (social capital) into favourable regulations (economic capital), or using western degrees and professional memberships (cultural capital) to gain legitimacy in global financial markets (symbolic capital) (Padayachee, 2021). Corporate governance reforms can therefore be interpreted as struggles over the distribution and recognition of different capitals within the business field.

2.3 World-systems theory: core, periphery and dependent development

World-systems theory, developed by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), views the global economy as structured around core, semi-peripheral and peripheral zones. Core countries control advanced technologies, strong states and large capital flows, while peripheral countries provide raw materials, cheap labour, and serve as markets.

In this perspective, corporate governance in the Global South cannot be separated from:

• Historical legacies of colonial extraction and unequal trade.

• Dependence on foreign capital, technology, and markets.

• Subordinate positions in global value chains.

Corporate governance reforms, especially those aiming to attract foreign portfolio investment, may therefore reinforce core–periphery dynamics if they primarily serve the interests of foreign investors and local elites, without strengthening domestic development strategies or worker and community rights (Michie and Padayachee, 2020). On the other hand, some Global South countries use corporate governance to promote broader goals, such as local content policies, board diversity, or stakeholder participation.

2.4 Institutional isomorphism: why firms look alike

Institutional theory, especially the concept of institutional isomorphism, examines how organisations become similar when subjected to similar pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Three main mechanisms are identified:

• Coercive isomorphism: driven by laws, regulations, and formal requirements.

• Mimetic isomorphism: imitation of perceived “successful” models, often in conditions of uncertainty.

• Normative isomorphism: professional norms and standards promoted by experts, consultants and professional associations.

In the Global South, institutional isomorphism can be seen in the widespread adoption of corporate governance codes, board committee structures, and ESG reporting formats modelled on international templates (Ararat, 2021; George, 2025). Firms and regulators mimic global “best practices” to signal modernity and to reduce perceived risk in the eyes of international investors.

However, isomorphism does not guarantee substantive accountability. Governance reforms may be implemented mainly for symbolic reasons, producing what some scholars call “window dressing” or “decoupling” between formal structures and everyday practice (Nakpodia, 2023; Jahid, 2023).

3. Method

This article adopts a qualitative, interpretive approach based on a narrative review of academic literature, complemented by selective use of policy reports and recent empirical studies on corporate governance in emerging and developing economies.

The steps followed were:

1. Identification of core concepts and theories. Key terms such as “corporate governance”, “Global South”, “accountability”, “ESG”, “emerging markets”, “Bourdieu”, “world-systems” and “institutional isomorphism” guided the literature search.

2. Selection of sources. Peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters and research monographs published in English were prioritised. Particular attention was given to:

   • Foundational theoretical works (Bourdieu, Wallerstein, DiMaggio and Powell).

   • Comparative corporate governance literature.

   • Recent studies (within the last five years) focusing on emerging markets and the Global South (Ararat, 2021; McNally, 2023; Joyce, 2024; Pargendler, 2023; Nasser, 2022; Bamel, 2025).

3. Thematic organisation. Materials were coded around four themes: ownership and control; regulatory frameworks; global standards and ESG; and civil society and digital transparency.

4. Theoretical integration. Empirical patterns were interpreted through the combined lenses of Bourdieu’s capital and field, world-systems inequality, and institutional isomorphism.

This method does not claim to be exhaustive or statistically representative. Rather, it aims to provide a structured and theoretically informed synthesis that can support further empirical work and practical reflection.

4. Analysis

4.1 Ownership structures, elites and the distribution of capital

A first key dimension of corporate governance in the Global South is concentrated ownership. Many firms, including listed companies, are controlled by:

• Business families with multiple cross-shareholdings and pyramid structures.

• State entities and sovereign funds.

• Hybrid conglomerates combining political and economic power.

From a Bourdieusian perspective, these patterns reflect long-term accumulation of economic and social capital within elite groups, often linked to colonial merchant families, post-independence industrialisation strategies, or more recent privatisation waves (Harvey, 2008; Padayachee, 2021).

As a result:

• Boards may be dominated by insiders and related parties, limiting genuine independence.

• Minority shareholders may have limited ability to influence decisions or challenge related-party transactions.

• Corporate elites may convert political ties into regulatory advantages, tax breaks, or public contracts.

Corporate governance reforms—such as requirements for independent directors, disclosure of beneficial ownership, or cumulative voting for board members—aim to dilute this concentration of power. In practice, however, these reforms sometimes lead to symbolic compliance without fundamental change. Independent directors may be socially or professionally dependent on controlling shareholders; disclosure rules may be circumvented by complex ownership chains.

At the same time, there are examples where governance reforms and investor activism have gradually increased board diversity, reduced some conflicts of interest, and improved transparency, especially in larger listed firms exposed to international capital markets (Ararat, 2021; McNally, 2023). The distribution of capital within the corporate field remains unequal, but the rules of the game are slowly shifting.

4.2 State, law and regulatory capacity

The second dimension concerns the role of the state and the quality of legal and regulatory institutions. In many Global South countries:

• Company law and securities regulation have been modernised to align with international norms.

• National corporate governance codes, stewardship codes, and listing rules have been introduced or updated.

• Regulators are expected to monitor disclosure, enforce rules and sanction misconduct (OECD, 2025; Nasser, 2022).

Yet enforcement gaps are frequent. Regulatory agencies may face limited budgets, political interference, or overlapping mandates. Courts may be slow or unpredictable, making private enforcement difficult. Informal settlements and negotiated solutions are common in high-profile cases.

World-systems theory helps explain why some countries adopt ambitious laws but struggle to enforce them. Peripheral and semi-peripheral states often face structural constraints: dependence on foreign investment, vulnerability to capital flight, and pressure to maintain “business-friendly” environments. In such contexts, strong enforcement against powerful firms or families may be seen as risky.

Institutional isomorphism is also visible here. Legislators borrow models from core countries or international guidelines, producing laws that look sophisticated on paper. However, without equal investments in judicial capacity, regulatory independence and civic oversight, these texts may not deliver the same accountability outcomes as in their original contexts (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Ararat, 2021).

4.3 Global standards, ESG and transnational accountability

A third domain is the growing influence of global standards related to ESG, sustainability and corporate responsibility. Large firms in the Global South increasingly:

• Publish sustainability or integrated reports.

• Respond to questionnaires from ratings agencies and index providers.

• Commit to voluntary codes on human rights, anti-corruption and environmental management (George, 2025; Jahid, 2023).

From a Bourdieusian perspective, ESG engagement is a way to accumulate symbolic capital—being recognised as a legitimate and responsible global actor—and to secure access to patient capital from international investors. At the same time, ESG practices are strongly shaped by institutional isomorphism. Firms imitate templates and language developed in the Global North, often emphasising formal policies and metrics rather than deeper changes in business models.

Recent studies examining ESG disclosure and firm performance in the Global South suggest mixed results: governance quality can strengthen the positive link between ESG and financial outcomes, but there are also risks of “greenwashing” when ESG becomes primarily a marketing tool rather than a governance transformation (Bamel, 2025).

World-systems theory reminds us that global ESG agendas are themselves products of power relations. Standards may focus on issues important to investors in core countries—such as climate risk disclosure or anti-corruption—while paying less attention to local priorities like land rights, informal labour, or community participation. When exported without adaptation, ESG frameworks may marginalise subaltern voices, even as they claim to enhance accountability.

4.4 Civil society, media and digital transparency

A fourth dimension involves non-state actors and digital technologies. In many Global South contexts, investigative journalists, non-governmental organisations, local communities and worker movements play a vital role in exposing corporate misconduct and pushing for accountability. Social media and digital platforms allow for rapid diffusion of information, naming and shaming of irresponsible firms, and mobilisation of consumer boycotts or shareholder campaigns.

This “bottom-up” accountability interacts with formal corporate governance mechanisms in complex ways. For instance:

• Revelations of corruption or environmental damage can trigger regulatory investigations and legal reforms.

• Public campaigns may lead firms to appoint new independent directors, change audit firms, or strengthen grievance mechanisms.

• Whistle-blowing channels and hotlines, once rare, are becoming more common in larger firms.

From a Bourdieu-inspired angle, these processes redistribute symbolic capital by challenging the taken-for-granted legitimacy of corporate elites. Groups that previously lacked economic power can exert influence through moral authority, public visibility and coalition-building. However, media freedom and civil society space are uneven across countries; in some regimes, activists and journalists face serious risks.

Digital transparency therefore opens new possibilities but does not automatically guarantee accountability. It must be accompanied by legal protection for whistle-blowers, independent media, and institutional channels through which public concerns can translate into governance reforms.

5. Findings and Discussion

Bringing together these strands, several key findings emerge.

5.1 Formal convergence, substantive divergence

First, there is clear evidence of formal convergence in corporate governance structures across the Global South. Many countries now have:

• Modern company laws and securities regulations.

• Corporate governance codes emphasising independent directors, board committees and disclosure.

• ESG reporting guidelines and stock exchange requirements.

This reflects strong coercive, mimetic and normative pressures, including from international investors, development institutions, and professional networks. Firms seek to look like their counterparts in the Global North to gain access to capital and legitimacy.

However, substantive divergence persists. In practice:

• Ownership concentration and political connections often continue to shape decision-making.

• Minority shareholder and stakeholder rights remain fragile, especially in smaller firms and unlisted entities.

• ESG and governance disclosures may be partial, selective or primarily symbolic.

This pattern is consistent with the idea of “decoupling” between formal structures and actual practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Nakpodia, 2023). Corporate governance reforms sometimes become rituals of modernity rather than effective tools for accountability.

5.2 Power, inequality and the reproduction of elites

Second, using Bourdieu’s framework highlights how corporate governance can both challenge and reproduce existing inequalities. Board reforms, disclosure rules and shareholder activism may open new spaces for contestation, yet the distribution of economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital still favours entrenched elites.

• Business families and politically connected groups often maintain control through complex ownership structures and informal influence.

• Professional experts—lawyers, auditors, consultants—act as gatekeepers who translate global governance norms into local practice, frequently adopting perspectives aligned with large investors.

• Worker and community voices are rarely institutionalised in boards or governance processes, despite being among the most affected stakeholders.

Nonetheless, cracks in elite dominance are visible. Gender diversity rules, for instance, have brought new actors into boardrooms, even if progress remains uneven (Saleh et al., 2021). Public scandals, court cases and activist campaigns have occasionally led to meaningful sanctions and governance changes.

5.3 Structural dependency and selective reform

Third, world-systems theory helps explain why reforms are often selective and oriented towards the concerns of core-country investors. In a context of structural dependency:

• Governments may prioritise reforms that signal openness and stability to global markets, such as shareholder rights and financial disclosure.

• Issues that could challenge transnational corporate strategies—such as binding obligations on labour rights, land restitution, or binding community consent—receive less attention.

• Corporate governance discourse tends to focus on “efficiency” and “investor confidence” more than on redistribution, inequality or historical injustice.

This does not mean that Global South actors simply follow external dictates. Domestic coalitions of reformers, technocrats, social movements and ethical businesses can use global governance language to advance progressive agendas, for example by pushing for board diversity, anti-corruption measures, or climate-related risk management (Pargendler, 2023; Padayachee, 2021). Yet, these efforts constantly encounter structural constraints.

5.4 Emerging role of ESG as a governance battleground

Fourth, ESG frameworks have become a key battleground for corporate governance and accountability in the Global South.

On the positive side:

• ESG disclosure requirements expand the scope of what counts as relevant information for investors and regulators, including environmental and social issues.

• Sustainability committees at board level can strengthen oversight of long-term risks and stakeholder concerns.

• Emerging empirical evidence suggests that strong governance enhances the value of ESG commitments, improving firm performance and risk management (Bamel, 2025; Kashi, 2024).

On the critical side:

• ESG can be used as a symbolic tool to gain legitimacy without significant behavioural change, especially when standards are voluntary and verification is weak.

• The indicators used may reflect priorities of rating agencies and asset managers in the Global North rather than local community needs.

• There is a risk that ESG becomes another arena where large firms with ample resources accumulate symbolic capital, while smaller local enterprises are left behind.

Overall, ESG governance in the Global South is still in flux. Its future trajectory will depend on how regulators, investors, and civil society negotiate trade-offs between flexibility and enforceability, global comparability and local relevance.

6. Conclusion

This article has explored corporate governance and accountability in the Global South through the combined lenses of Bourdieu’s theory of capital and field, world-systems theory, and institutional isomorphism. It has argued that while corporate governance reforms have diffused widely—spurred by financial globalisation, ESG agendas and transnational professional networks—accountability outcomes remain uneven and contested.

Several key conclusions can be drawn:

1. Corporate governance is deeply political. It cannot be reduced to technical rules about board structures or disclosure. It reflects and reshapes power relations among owners, managers, workers, communities and the state. In the Global South, these relations are marked by historical inequalities, concentrated ownership and structural dependency.

2. Formal adoption of “global best practices” is not enough. Institutional isomorphism explains why many firms and regulators adopt similar governance templates. Yet, without attention to enforcement capacity, media freedom, judicial independence and civic participation, these templates may remain largely symbolic.

3. Accountability requires redistribution of different forms of capital. Bourdieu’s framework highlights that genuine change requires shifts in economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital. This includes diversifying board composition, opening elite networks, strengthening professional ethics, and valuing local knowledge and community voices.

4. World-systems inequalities shape what reforms are politically feasible. Peripheral and semi-peripheral states often face pressures to reassure investors and avoid capital flight. This can limit their willingness to impose strong obligations on powerful firms. International cooperation, including South–South learning, is needed to overcome these constraints and to design governance models aligned with developmental and social goals.

5. ESG offers both opportunities and risks. If designed and implemented well, ESG frameworks can broaden accountability, integrate long-term risks, and give greater visibility to environmental and social impacts. If treated merely as a branding exercise, they risk reinforcing existing inequalities and diverting attention from deeper reforms.

For policymakers and regulators in the Global South, the challenge is to move from symbolic convergence to substantive accountability. This may involve:

• Strengthening independent regulators and courts.

• Enhancing transparency of beneficial ownership and political connections.

• Institutionalising stakeholder representation and grievance mechanisms.

• Supporting investigative journalism and protecting whistle-blowers.

• Encouraging responsible investment strategies that align with local development priorities.

For researchers, future work could focus on:

• Detailed country and sector case studies that track how governance reforms play out over time.

• Comparative analyses of board dynamics, gender and diversity, and the role of professionals.

• Empirical studies linking governance quality to environmental justice, labour conditions, and community well-being, not only financial performance.

Corporate governance in the Global South is not a marginal or derivative topic. It is central to questions of how economic power is organised, who benefits from growth, and how societies can transition towards more inclusive and sustainable futures.

Hashtags

#CorporateGovernance #GlobalSouth #Accountability #ESG #EmergingMarkets #BusinessEthics #SustainableDevelopment

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