top of page
Search

The Yen Carry Trade in 2026: Why Japan’s Policy Normalization Is Reshaping Global Risk, Capital Flows, and Institutional Behavior

Author: L. Rahman

Affiliation: Independent Researcher


Abstract

The yen carry trade—borrowing in Japanese yen at relatively low interest rates to invest in higher-yielding assets elsewhere—has long functioned as a quiet engine of global liquidity. In early 2026, it has re-entered the spotlight as Japan’s political and monetary environment shifts and as markets reassess how “safe” yen-funded leverage really is. This article explains why the yen carry trade is trending again, and why its unwind risk matters beyond foreign exchange markets. Using a theory-grounded framework combining (1) Bourdieu’s field theory and forms of capital, (2) world-systems theory’s core–periphery capital circulation, and (3) institutional isomorphism in finance, the article argues that the carry trade is not merely a technical strategy—it is a structured social practice shaped by shared norms, competitive imitation, and global hierarchy. Methodologically, the paper uses a structured qualitative synthesis of recent institutional research and academic literature, alongside process tracing of key market episodes (the August 2024 turbulence and the 2025–2026 normalization narrative). Findings suggest that the main risk in 2026 is not “the end” of carry trades, but a regime change: rising Japanese rates, higher bond volatility, and policy uncertainty increase the probability of discontinuous deleveraging, with spillovers to equities, credit, and emerging-market funding conditions. The paper concludes with practical implications for risk governance, tourism and real-economy exposure (through exchange-rate channels), and technology-enabled leverage.


Keywords: yen, carry trade, global liquidity, monetary normalization, institutional behavior, currency crashes, Japan, financial contagion


1. Introduction

A carry trade sounds simple: borrow in a low-interest-rate currency and invest in a higher-yielding one. For decades, the Japanese yen has been one of the most important funding currencies for this strategy because Japan maintained exceptionally accommodative monetary conditions for a long period. What makes the carry trade powerful is not only the interest rate differential but also leverage, derivatives, and a widespread belief that exchange rates will not move sharply against the position.

In 2026, the yen carry trade is trending again because Japan is no longer seen as a permanently “low-rate, low-volatility” anchor. Market narratives increasingly emphasize Japan’s policy normalization and the global consequences of any sudden yen appreciation or volatility spike. Recent market commentary highlights that Japan’s normalization process can alter global liquidity conditions and raise the probability of an abrupt carry-trade unwind.

This matters beyond currency markets. Yen-funded leverage has historically supported positions in global equities, credit, and higher-yielding currencies. When those positions unwind quickly, the resulting shock can transmit across markets and regions. A BIS analysis of the August 2024 episode described how turbulence coincided with a sharp yen appreciation and emphasized the yen’s role as a predominant funding currency.   BIS statistical work also documents sizeable changes in measures consistent with carry-trade build-ups during 2021–2024.

This article addresses a practical question: What is structurally changing about the yen carry trade in 2026, and why does it matter for management, tourism, and technology-driven finance?

To answer, the paper uses three complementary theories that help explain why institutions behave similarly, how global hierarchies shape capital flows, and how trading strategies become normalized and reproduced.


2. Background and Theoretical Framework

2.1 The Yen Carry Trade as a Social Practice (Bourdieu)

Bourdieu’s sociology helps interpret finance as a field—a structured space where actors compete using different forms of capital (economic, social, cultural, symbolic). In the financial field, the carry trade is not just a calculation; it is a practice that becomes legitimate through:

  • Symbolic capital: reputational validation (“this is a standard macro trade”)

  • Cultural capital: shared models, risk frameworks, and trader education

  • Social capital: networks linking banks, funds, prime brokers, and analysts

  • Economic capital: access to cheap funding, leverage, and collateral

When many institutions internalize similar narratives (“the yen is stable,” “Japan stays low-rate”), the strategy becomes embedded and self-reinforcing. The field then produces doxa—assumptions that feel natural until disrupted by volatility or policy change. The August 2024 turbulence is a useful example of how “minor news” and shifting expectations can catalyze collective repositioning.


2.2 Core–Periphery Liquidity Circulation (World-Systems Theory)

World-systems theory emphasizes the global economy as a hierarchy of core, semi-periphery, and periphery. In this lens, Japan has often played a distinctive role: a technologically advanced core economy that, for many years, exported liquidity through low domestic rates and global investment behavior. Carry trades can be interpreted as a channel through which core funding conditions shape periphery asset pricing.

When yen-funded liquidity expands, it can support capital inflows into higher-yielding markets (often including emerging markets and risk assets). When it contracts rapidly, those markets can face sharper reversals. This is consistent with institutional analyses warning that an unwind of yen carry trades can transmit stress across risk assets and regions.


2.3 Why Everyone Copies Everyone (Institutional Isomorphism)

DiMaggio and Powell’s concept of institutional isomorphism explains why organizations converge on similar strategies:

  • Coercive pressures: regulation, margin rules, reporting standards

  • Normative pressures: shared professional training, risk committees, “best practice”

  • Mimetic pressures: imitation under uncertainty (“top funds are doing it”)

Carry trades often become “institutionalized” as standard macro or multi-asset behavior, especially when volatility is low and performance looks persistent. When many institutions hold similar positions, systemic risk increases: the unwind becomes crowded and nonlinear. BIS work on carry trades highlights the importance of measurement, derivatives structures, and vulnerabilities that are not always visible on balance sheets.


3. Method

This article uses a structured qualitative synthesis and process tracing approach.

  1. Structured qualitative synthesis:

    • Reviewed institutional research and academic finance literature on carry trades, crash risk, and funding constraints (2022–2025 emphasis).

    • Prioritized sources within the past five years where available, including BIS and peer-reviewed studies.

  2. Process tracing of key episodes:

    • The August 2024 turbulence as a documented unwind and volatility shock.

    • The 2025–2026 normalization narrative as an evolving regime, including market commentary on Japan’s rate environment and bond volatility.

  3. Theory-driven interpretation:

    • Observations are mapped to the three theoretical lenses (field, hierarchy, isomorphism) to explain why the carry trade expands, why it becomes crowded, and why unwind dynamics can be abrupt.

This design does not attempt to estimate a single “true size” of carry trades (which is difficult due to derivatives and off-balance-sheet activity). Instead, it focuses on mechanisms and risk pathways, consistent with BIS and regional surveillance work emphasizing data gaps and indirect measurement.


4. Analysis

4.1 What Changed: From “Permanent Cheap Yen” to “Conditional Cheap Yen”

The carry trade thrives when three conditions coexist:

  1. Low funding cost (low Japanese rates)

  2. Low FX volatility (yen does not strengthen sharply)

  3. Risk-on global appetite (credit spreads tight, equities strong)

In 2026, each condition is less reliable. Market discussions increasingly frame Japan as normalizing policy, with higher yields and more sensitivity to inflation expectations and politics.   When a funding currency becomes less predictable, leveraged strategies face greater tail risk even if average returns remain appealing.

A crucial point is that carry trades are often built on confidence in stability, not only interest differentials. If the market begins to price more frequent yen strength episodes, the carry trade’s “hidden insurance premium” rises. That can cause funds and banks to reduce exposures preemptively—especially if their risk models (Value-at-Risk, stress tests, margin requirements) tighten mechanically.


4.2 The August 2024 Turbulence as a Template for 2026 Risk

The August 2024 episode is widely referenced because it illustrates how fast the carry trade can reverse. A BIS Bulletin describes turbulence associated with a sharp yen appreciation and highlights that the yen is the predominant carry funding currency.   Reuters reporting at the time also emphasized the scale of the yen-funded carry trade and the degree of unwind still underway.

Why does this matter in 2026? Because the mechanism is repeatable:

  • A shift in expectations about Japan policy or US policy

  • A volatility shock that triggers stop-outs and margin calls

  • Crowded positioning that accelerates exits

  • Spillover into equities and credit as leveraged “packages” unwind

BIS statistical analysis indicates that measures consistent with net yen supply rose substantially during the build-up phase, reinforcing the idea that positioning can become large and correlated with yen depreciation and incentives to carry.


4.3 The “Field” Dynamics: How Narratives Become Risk

From Bourdieu’s perspective, finance is shaped by shared narratives that become taken-for-granted truths. Carry trades gain symbolic legitimacy when:

  • Major banks publish supportive research

  • Funds report consistent performance

  • Models show stable correlations

  • Professional networks repeat the same story

In a crowded field, institutions compete for relative performance. If “everyone” can borrow cheaply in yen, the differentiator becomes leverage, speed, and instrument choice (FX forwards, swaps, options, or cross-asset packages). This competition can increase fragility: small changes in volatility assumptions lead to large changes in allowable exposure.

The field also shapes what risk managers treat as “normal.” The danger is not ignorance, but standardization—risk becomes normalized until the regime shifts.


4.4 World-Systems Perspective: Why Emerging Markets Care

From a world-systems angle, yen carry trades are part of a broader pattern: liquidity generated in core economies influences peripheral and semi-peripheral asset markets. When funding is abundant, capital seeks yield globally; when funding tightens, peripheral markets may face sudden stops, currency pressure, and tighter financial conditions.

Regional surveillance notes explicitly ask how Asian economies may be affected by an unwind of yen carry trades, emphasizing spillover channels and policy mitigation.   Even when local fundamentals are stable, global positioning can dominate short-run price action.


4.5 Institutional Isomorphism: Why Unwinds Become Nonlinear

Institutional isomorphism explains why many firms end up with similar exposures:

  • Similar risk models (normative)

  • Similar benchmarks and peer pressure (mimetic)

  • Similar constraints from prime brokers and regulators (coercive)

This convergence is not accidental; it is a rational response to uncertainty. But it increases systemic vulnerability. When the yen strengthens quickly, many institutions receive the same signals simultaneously:

  • FX loss limits hit

  • Volatility triggers reduce risk budgets

  • Margin requirements rise

  • Liquidity thins

The result is a nonlinear unwind—more like a crowd moving through a narrow exit than a smooth adjustment.

Academic work reinforces that carry trades embed crash risk and that funding constraints can amplify adverse moves. While the classic crash-risk framing is older, recent research continues to show how funding risk and constraints matter for currency speculation and carry returns.


5. Findings

Finding 1: The 2026 “Carry Trade Question” Is Really a Governance Question

The main challenge is not whether the carry trade exists, but how institutions govern leverage under regime uncertainty. As Japan normalizes, the distribution of outcomes becomes wider: slow, orderly adjustment is possible, but so are sharp de-risking episodes when volatility spikes. Recent market-facing research explicitly warns that a sudden unwind could transmit stress across equities, credit, and broader risk assets.

Management implication: firms exposed to global funding conditions (banks, insurers, multi-nationals) should treat yen carry exposure as a systemic factor, not a niche FX issue.


Finding 2: The Strategy Is Increasingly “Technologized,” Raising Speed Risk

Technology has changed carry trades. Algorithmic execution, rapid cross-asset hedging, and automated risk controls can reduce day-to-day costs—but they can also synchronize exits. When volatility rises, automated de-risking may amplify market moves.

Technology implication: faster execution does not eliminate risk; it can compress time for human decision-making and increase crowd effects.


Finding 3: Tourism and Real Economy Channels Are Often Underestimated

Tourism and hospitality are exchange-rate sensitive. A stronger yen can:

  • Increase outbound Japanese tourism purchasing power

  • Reduce inbound tourism attractiveness (Japan becomes more expensive for foreigners)

  • Shift airline, hotel, and retail flows

Meanwhile, a weaker yen supports inbound tourism and foreign spending in Japan, but may raise import costs and inflation pressures, feeding back into policy. In 2026, the key point is volatility: firms planning pricing, staffing, and procurement suffer when exchange rates move unpredictably.

Tourism/management implication: scenario planning should include yen volatility regimes, not only average FX forecasts.


Finding 4: The “Crowdedness” Problem Remains Even If Rates Rise Gradually

Even with gradual rate changes, positioning can remain crowded because the incentive is relative: if global rate differentials stay large, the strategy may remain attractive. BIS statistics highlight that measuring the strategy is difficult and that significant activity may occur via derivatives markets.

Risk implication: monitoring should focus on volatility, liquidity, and funding constraints—not just the level of Japanese rates.


Finding 5: The Most Likely Stress Pathway Is Cross-Asset, Not Pure FX

The carry trade often sits inside broader portfolios. When it unwinds, institutions may sell equities or credit to reduce overall risk, even if their initial problem is FX. The August 2024 documentation is relevant precisely because it links yen moves with broader turbulence.

Portfolio implication: the yen carry trade is a global “risk-on/risk-off” transmission channel.


6. Conclusion

The yen carry trade is trending in 2026 because Japan is increasingly perceived as moving from a decades-long exception—near-permanent low rates and predictable funding—toward a more normal, conditional policy regime. That shift matters because the carry trade is not simply an individual investor choice; it is a socially reproduced practice embedded in the financial field, reinforced by institutional imitation, and connected to world-system capital circulation.

The evidence reviewed suggests a regime change rather than an extinction. Carry trades can persist, but their risk profile changes as funding costs rise, volatility becomes more plausible, and political–policy narratives become more influential. The key lesson for managers, policymakers, and researchers is that carry-trade risk is systemic and cross-asset: it can propagate from FX to equities, credit, and emerging-market financing conditions.

For organizations in management, tourism, and technology-driven finance, the practical response is disciplined scenario planning, stress testing for discontinuous yen moves, and governance frameworks that recognize how crowded strategies behave under uncertainty. In short: the yen carry trade in 2026 is a test of institutional resilience, not just market timing.


Hashtags


References

  • Aquilina, M., Lombardi, M., Schrimpf, A. and Sushko, V., 2024. The market turbulence and carry trade unwind of August 2024. Basel: Bank for International Settlements (BIS Bulletin No. 90). Available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull90.pdf 

  • Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 2024. BIS Quarterly Review: September 2024. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2409.pdf 

  • Borio, C., McCauley, R. and McGuire, P., 2022. Dollar debt in FX swaps and forwards: huge, missing and growing. BIS Quarterly Review, December. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2212.pdf

  • Brunnermeier, M.K., Nagel, S. and Pedersen, L.H., 2008. Carry trades and currency crashes. In: D. Acemoglu, K. Rogoff and M. Woodford (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2008, Volume 23. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 313–347. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/ma.23.25554901

  • Brunnermeier, M.K. and Pedersen, L.H., 2009. Market liquidity and funding liquidity. Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), pp. 2201–2238. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn098

  • DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W., 1983. The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), pp. 147–160. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2095101

  • Filipe, S.F., Nissinen, J. and Suominen, M., 2023. Currency carry trades and global funding risk. Journal of Banking & Finance, 149, Article 106800. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106800 

  • Gabaix, X. and Maggiori, M., 2015. International liquidity and exchange rate dynamics. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(3), pp. 1369–1420. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv016

  • McGuire, P. and von Peter, G., 2024. Sizing up carry trades in BIS statistics. In: BIS Quarterly Review: September 2024 (Box D). Basel: Bank for International Settlements, pp. 16–18. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2409.pdf 

  • ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), 2024. Understanding Currency Carry Trades: The Yen Carry Trade and Its Impact on ASEAN+3 Economies. Singapore: AMRO (Analytical Note, 19 December). Available at: https://amro-asia.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/20241219-Analytical_Note_Carry_Trade.pdf 

  • International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2025. Japan: 2025 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Japan. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Available at: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1jpnea2025001-print-pdf.pdf 

  • Bourdieu, P., 1990. The Logic of Practice. Cambridge: Polity Press.

  • Bourdieu, P., 1986. The forms of capital. In: J.G. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. New York, NY: Greenwood Press, pp. 241–258.

  • Wallerstein, I., 2004. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

  • Hsu, P.-H., Li, Y., Taylor, M.P. and Wang, Z., 2025. On the Profitability of Influential Carry Trade Strategies: Data Snooping Bias and Post-Publication Performance. Rochester, NY: SSRN (Working Paper). DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5228361 

  • Pojarliev, M. and Levich, R.M., 2011. Detecting crowded trades in currency funds. Financial Analysts Journal, 67(1), pp. 26–39. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v67.n1.4

  • Baba, N. and Packer, F., 2009. Interpreting deviations from covered interest parity during the financial market turmoil of 2007–08. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(11), pp. 1953–1962. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.04.011

  • Du, W., Tepper, A. and Verdelhan, A., 2018. Deviations from covered interest rate parity. Journal of Finance, 73(3), pp. 915–957. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12620

 
 
 

Recent Posts

See All
New Aragon and the “Make Your Own Country” Moment

Author:  L. Kareem Affiliation:  Independent Researcher Abstract The idea of “making your own country” has resurfaced this week across online forums, entrepreneurship circles, and civic-technology com

 
 
 

Comments


SIU. Publishers

Be the First to Know

Sign up for our newsletter

Thanks for submitting!

© since 2013 by SIU. Publishers

Swiss International University
SIU is a registered Higher Education University Registration Number 304742-3310-OOO
www.SwissUniversity.com

© Swiss International University (SIU). All rights reserved.
Member of VBNN Smart Education Group (VBNN FZE LLC – License No. 262425649888, Ajman, UAE)

Global Offices:

  • 📍 Zurich Office: AAHES – Autonomous Academy of Higher Education in Switzerland, Freilagerstrasse 39, 8047 Zurich, Switzerland

  • 📍 Luzern Office: ISBM Switzerland – International School of Business Management, Lucerne, Industriestrasse 59, 6034 Luzern, Switzerland

  • 📍 Dubai Office: ISB Academy Dubai – Swiss International Institute in Dubai, UAE, CEO Building, Dubai Investment Park, Dubai, UAE

  • 📍 Ajman Office: VBNN Smart Education Group – Amber Gem Tower, Ajman, UAE

  • 📍 London Office: OUS Academy London – Swiss Academy in the United Kingdom, 167–169 Great Portland Street, London W1W 5PF, England, UK

  • 📍 Riga Office: Amber Academy, Stabu Iela 52, LV-1011 Riga, Latvia

  • 📍 Osh Office: KUIPI Kyrgyz-Uzbek International Pedagogical Institute, Gafanzarova Street 53, Dzhandylik, Osh, Kyrgyz Republic

  • 📍 Bishkek Office: SIU Swiss International University, 74 Shabdan Baatyr Street, Bishkek City, Kyrgyz Republic

  • 📍 U7Y Journal – Unveiling Seven Continents Yearbook (ISSN 3042-4399)

  • 📍 ​Online: OUS International Academy in Switzerland®, SDBS Swiss Distance Business School®, SOHS Swiss Online Hospitality School®, YJD Global Center for Diplomacy®

bottom of page