History of Politics: A Study in Institutional Change, Global Structures, and Political Practice

Saule Tulegenova — Independent Researcher

Abstract

This article examines the historical evolution of politics with special attention to contemporary trends around populism, institutional erosion, and global power shifts. Using theories drawn from Pierre Bourdieu, world‐systems theory, and institutional isomorphism, the paper analyses how political structures adapt and change under internal pressures (from society, elites) and external pressures (global systems, cultural models). The research is based on a comparative historical method, using case studies from Europe, Latin America, and Central Asia. Findings show that political institutions today increasingly mimic populist forms in order to gain legitimacy, even in democratic regimes; that global power realignments (especially between major states) reshape national political histories; and that institutional isomorphism drives formally distinct regimes to converge in style and practice. The conclusion suggests that understanding the history of politics requires seeing both the deep structures of global order and the micro‐practices of legitimacy within nations.

Introduction

Politics, as human activity, has existed as long as societies have existed. Yet the ways in which politics is organized, represented, and institutionalized have changed over centuries. At present, there is a renewed interest in the “history of politics”—not only as archival storytelling but as a lens through which we understand modern problems: populism, declining trust in institutions, global power shifts, and erosion of democratic norms. This article seeks to contribute to that interest by explaining how historical patterns in politics shape today’s political realities.

Specifically, we ask: How do global systems and institutional pressures influence the evolution of political institutions over time? How do internal actors (elites, citizens, political parties) respond to demands for legitimacy in changing contexts? What role do mimicry and isomorphic pressures play in the convergence of political forms? To answer, the article draws on three theoretical lenses—Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, and symbolic power; world‐systems theory; and institutional isomorphism—and applies them to comparative historical data. The aim is to trace continuity and change in political histories and to explain current political trends as rooted in both historical precedent and transnational structural pressures.

Background

To ground this study, we briefly review some relevant theory.

1. Bourdieu: Habitus, Field, Symbolic Power

   Pierre Bourdieu emphasised that society is structured by fields—social arenas with their own rules—and by habitus, the internalised dispositions carried by individuals and groups. In political history, elites, parties, and citizens inhabit a political field shaped by symbolic power: the power to define what counts as legitimate. Over time, political actors acquire habitus that guides their expectations and behaviour; for example, how to perform campaign, speak in public, or use media. The history of politics, in Bourdieu’s view, is a history of struggle over symbolic capital—who defines proper norms, who controls the terms of debate.

2. World‐Systems Theory

   World‐systems theory, associated with Immanuel Wallerstein and others, holds that the world is divided into core, semi‐peripheral, and peripheral zones. Core states exert power economically, politically, and culturally; peripheral states are often dependent; semi‐peripheral are in between. Political institutions and political histories in peripheral and semi‐peripheral states are often shaped by external pressures: colonialism, global capitalism, foreign interventions, international norms. These external influences affect domestic political evolution, often pushing toward forms that align with global expectations (for example, elections, constitutions) even if the internal practice differs.

3. Institutional Isomorphism

   Institutional isomorphism comes from organizational sociology (DiMaggio and Powell). It suggests that organizations (including political institutions) become more alike over time because of coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures. Coercive pressures might include international treaties, aid conditionalities; mimetic pressures emerge when uncertain actors copy successful models; normative pressures come via professionalization, norms of democracy, human rights. These pressures cause distant political systems—even with different history—to look similar in institutional form.

By combining these theories, this paper sees the history of politics as shaped by struggle within fields (Bourdieu), by global hierarchies and dependencies (world‐systems), and by pressures toward similarity (isomorphism). We test these ideas with examples from recent decades, particularly in regions undergoing rapid political change.

Method

The research uses a comparative historical method. Three cases are selected:

• A European case: for example, a Western European democracy showing institutional stress under populist politics.

• A Latin American case: where populism has a long history and recent examples show shifts in party structure, constitutional change.

• A Central Asian case: representing semi‐peripheral or peripheral position in world system, interacting with both domestic history and external influences.

Data sources include historical documents, academic literature, published constitutions, elite speeches, party manifestos, and secondary historical accounts. We examine political institutions—constitutions, electoral laws, party systems—and political practices—campaigning, leadership styles, media, mechanisms of legitimacy. We look for evidence of mimicry, coercion from global actors, and symbolic power struggles.

Analysis proceeds in three stages:

1. Tracing historical trajectories: how political institutions developed over the past 50–100 years in each case.

2. Identifying external/global pressures: colonial legacies, international norms, foreign aid, international organizations.

3. Identifying internal practices: how elites and citizens employ symbols, narratives, media to assert legitimacy; how political institutions adapt or resist external pressures.

Through this, we aim to show how history, global structure, and isomorphic pressures together shape current political form.

Analysis

Below we present comparative analysis of the three cases along the lines above.

Case 1: Western Europe (e.g., Country A)

(Here “Country A” stands for a Western democratic state undergoing populist pressures.)

• Historical trajectory: After WWII, Country A developed stable democratic institutions: constitution, parliament, multiparty system, independent judiciary. Political parties held moderate ideologies; voting was regular and trustworthy.

• From 1990s onward, pressures emerged: globalization, economic crises (2008), rising inequality, migration. Populist parties (left‐wing and right‐wing) began to challenge mainstream parties.

• Global and external pressures: Membership to international bodies (European Union, trade blocs) demanded compliance with democratic norms, human rights, rule of law. Financial institutions (IMF, ECB) pressed for austerity or structural reforms. Media norms, international NGOs exerted normative pressure.

• Internal practices and symbolic struggles: Populist leaders used symbolic language (“the people vs the elite”), media spectacles, rhetoric of crisis. They claimed the mainstream institutions had become distant, corrupt. They mimicked democratic institutions (having elections, parliaments) but challenged the legitimacy of checks and balances, sometimes attacking judicial independence or press.

• Isomorphic pressures: Mainstream parties, to counter populists, have adopted populist‐style rhetoric, direct appeals, personalization of leadership. This mimetic adoption shows how isomorphism operates: in reaction, parties that did not historically engage in populist style mimic those that do to remain competitive. Electoral rules sometimes adjusted (e.g., to allow referenda, to centralize leadership) in ways similar to populist models.

Case 2: Latin America (e.g., Country B)

• Historical trajectory: Latin America has a longer history of populism—figures like Perón in Argentina; Vargas in Brazil; more recently leaders who combine personalistic leadership, mass mobilization, rhetoric of sovereignty.

• Following periods of authoritarianism (military rule, dictatorships) many states transitioned to democracy in 1980s–1990s, often under pressure from international bodies (OAS, UN), foreign lenders, and norms of “the Washington Consensus”.

• Global and external pressures: International financial institutions conditioned aid and debt relief on democratic governance and market reforms. Trade agreements required political stability and rule of law. Civil society and global NGOs promoted human rights norms.

• Internal practices and symbolic struggles: Leaders in Country B have long drawn legitimacy from charismatic authority, direct mass mobilization, slogans of “returning power to the people”. Often, democratic institutions (constitutions, courts) have been more formal than real—strong presidents, weak checks, judicial appointments shaped by executives.

• Isomorphic pressures: Newer democracies adopted constitutions modeled on North American or European systems. Parties borrowed campaign styles, media strategies. Even non‐populist parties sometimes adopt populist discourses or promise strong leadership, in response to citizen frustration. Electoral institutions and norms mimic those of the global democratic community—elections, referenda, term limits—even when those features are weak in practice.

Case 3: Central Asia (e.g., Country C)

• Historical trajectory: Many Central Asian states were formerly part of the Soviet Union; after independence (1990s), they inherited centralized political structures, single strong party or leader, weak separation of powers, limited pluralism.

• Over time, these states have engaged in political reform (constitutions, elections) in response to internal legitimacy crises and external pressures.

• Global and external pressures: International organizations, donor agencies, foreign investment require lower corruption, rule of law, “good governance”. Regional powers exert influence. Global norms push for election observance. However, external coercion is often shallow or symbolic.

• Internal practices and symbolic struggles: Leaders cultivate legitimacy via nationalism, cultural revival, control of media, state ideology. They use historical narratives (pre‐Soviet past), cultural symbols, religious identity, to shape popular support. Elections are held, but often not fully free or fair; opposition is controlled.

• Isomorphic pressures: Institutions such as electoral commissions, constitutions, human rights commissions are established, sometimes copied from international models. Titles, legal forms, official discourses conform to global expectations. Yet in practice, many features are cosmetic.

Findings

From the comparative analysis, several core findings emerge.

1. Hybridization of political formsAcross all regions, political institutions are increasingly hybrid: they combine democratic, authoritarian, populist features. For example, elections exist alongside strong executive control; legal constraints are present but weakly enforced. This suggests that formal institutions are frequently adapted or hollowed to preserve elite control, rather than purely transformed.

2. Symbolic legitimacy becomes centralLegitimacy is less about procedural faithfulness to democratic norms than about symbol, narrative, and public performance. Populist and “strong” leaders who can claim representation of “the people”, who can tell stories of identity, crises, threat, achieve legitimacy even when institutional trust is low.

3. Global pressures shape but do not determineWorld‐system position and external pressures (donor conditionality, norms of democracy, membership in international institutions) exert coercive and normative pressures. However, countries vary widely in how deeply these pressures reshape practice. In peripheral or semi‐peripheral states, many institutions are adopted in form only; core meaning may be reshaped domestically.

4. Institutional isomorphism causes convergence of form, divergence of functionPolitical institutions in diverse contexts tend to look similar: constitutions with term limits, separation of powers, multiparty elections, oversight commissions. Yet their functions differ. The judiciary might not be independent; elections may favor incumbents. The convergence is formal rather than substantive in many cases.

5. Historical legacies continue to matterPast political structures (colonial administration, Soviet system, authoritarian precedents) leave deep imprints on habitus: expectations of leadership, role of the state, public participation. These legacies mediate how external pressures and isomorphic models are internalized or resisted.

6. The rising critique of institutionsCitizens across regions increasingly distrust formal institutions—parliaments, courts, parties—and question whether they serve them. This fuels populist appeal. Political actors respond by delegitimizing oversight bodies, emphasizing direct mandates, or attacking “elite” institutions.

Conclusion

The history of politics is not simply a chronological record of institutions or leaders, but a complex interplay of structure, symbol, and struggle. The findings of this study show that in the current age, political forms are remade under pressures from global systems, internal crises, and symbolic demands. Institutional isomorphism leads to convergence in appearance, but deep divergence in practice persists, especially in peripheral or semi‐peripheral states. The habitus shaped by historical legacies interacts with world‐system position to produce unique political trajectories.

For scholars and practitioners, the implications are significant. First, reforms that focus solely on formal changes (new constitutions, elections) without attention to underlying practices and symbolic legitimacy may fail to produce durable change. Second, understanding the agency of political actors—leaders, elites, citizens—in shaping or resisting global norms is essential. Third, efforts to strengthen democratic norms should consider historical legacies and the symbolic dimension of politics.

In short, the history of politics remains deeply relevant: it shapes how institutions are built, how they change, how they are used. Future research should continue to combine structural and actor‐centred approaches, consider symbolic power as central, and pay attention to both global and local pressures.

References

Bourdieu, Pierre. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power. Harvard University Press, 1991.

DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American Sociological Review, vol. 48, no. 2, 1983, pp. 147–160.

Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Cornell University Press, 1983.

Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.” Political Studies, vol. 44, no. 5, 1996, pp. 936–957.

North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World‐System. Vol. I. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World‐Economy in the Sixteenth Century. Academic Press, 1974.

Weyland, Kurt. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017.

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